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Abstract
There is a need for efficient communication protocols that allow the private
and scalable deployment of RFID systems with a large number of tags. In
this paper, we leverage the idea of using distributed, collaborative readers
to identify RFID tags and propose a new probabilistic communication pro-
tocol for those readers to privately identify RFID tags more efficiently in
terms of computational cost and bandwidth usage. Our protocol, which is
based on Hash-locks, allows readers to exchange information so as to reduce
the amount of tag IDs stored in their caches. Consequently, our proposal im-
proves the scalability of the system, and allows the easy management of large
amounts of tags. We provide simulation results showing that our proposal is
more efficient and flexible than previous ones in terms of computational cost
and bandwidth usage.
Keywords: RFID, protocol, scalability, privacy, security.
1. Introduction
Radio frequency identification (RFID) technology allows the cheap, rapid,
and efficient management of goods and people. It has gained importance in
a variety of areas, namely transportation, retailing, access control, etc.
Tags and readers are the basic elements of RFID systems. Readers are
the active components. They are active in the sense that they do not re-
quire others to power them up, this is, they have their own source of energy
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and they can initiate communications. On the other hand, tags are the pas-
sive components of the RFID system. They have neither an energy source
nor capability to initiate communications (Note that active tags also exist,
however they are far more expensive than passive tags. Thus, the latter
are more common regardless of their computational and storage limitations).
Readers are used to wirelessly power up tags and retrieve information from
them - generally an electronic product code (EPC). Tags can be attached to
almost everything, and due to the ability of readers to query tags without
visual contact, logistics providers and large retailers find these systems very
convenient. Notwithstanding, due to the fact that tags can be accessed re-
motely, if the proper privacy measures are not taken, unauthorised people
could obtain private information (e.g. a company could gauge the inven-
tory of its competitors to modify the prices of its own products accordingly).
To cope with this privacy/security problem efficiently, several solutions have
been proposed. Most of them might be classified into two main families: i)
tree-based solutions and ii) hash-based solutions.
Tree-based solutions aim at reducing the cost of identifying tags in the
readers’ side by using a labelled tree of a given depth d, where the label
of each node is a unique key. These trees contain N leaves, and each leaf
corresponds to an RFID tag. Each label in the path from the tree root
to a given leaf belongs to the set of keys that identifies the tag assigned
to that leaf. With this set of keys, it is possible for a reader to identify a
tag in logarithmic time (O(logN)) (1). However, tree-based protocols suffer
from three main shortcomings: i) the authentication process requires several
rounds, ii) the size of the sent messages may be too large, and iii) they are
vulnerable to compromising attacks (2, 3).
On the other hand, hash-based protocols usually operate on a single round
and aim at reducing the identification cost in the side of the tag by using
lightweight cryptography (i.e. one-way hash functions and random numbers
generators). The improved randomised hash-locks (IRHL) (4) are one of the
most interesting proposals in terms of computational requirements in the tag
side. The basic identification operation between tags and readers performed
by using IRHL consists of three steps (cf. Figure 1):
1. A reader (R) generates a random number r1 and sends it to a tag (T ).
2. T receives r1 and generates its own random number r2. With these
random numbers and its identification number (IDT ), T computes a
response r = (r2, h(r1||r2||IDT )), where h(.) is a one-way hash function
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Reader (R) Tag (T)
Generates r1
r1−−−→
Generates r2
r
←−−− r = (r2, h(r1||r2||IDT ))
Computes rTi
rTi = (r2, h(r1||r2||IDTi))
Identifies T as Ti when r
Ti = r
Figure 1: Scheme of the Improved Randomized Hash-locks Protocol
and (||) is the concatenation operator.
3. Finally, when R receives r, it has to generate all possible responses
rTi = h(r1||r2||IDTi) for all the tag IDs in its database and compare
the result with r. When rTi = r the tag is identified as Ti.
Although the computational cost in the tag side is considerably low, read-
ers must perform a number of operations that linearly grows with the num-
ber of tags. Due to the large number of tags that might be managed in, for
example, manufacturing processes, readers must hand over this task to cen-
tralised mainframes, thus generating bottlenecks and undesired delays and
extra costs. With the aim to improve the scalability of the system, Henrici
and Müller proposed another hash-based protocol (5). In that protocol each
tag belongs to a group and has two keys: a group key and an individual
key. Thus, the reader first identifies the group and later identifies the tag
within the group. This way, identifying the tag is faster because there are
less groups than tags. However, if a tag T is tampered with by an attacker,
every tag T ′ belonging to the group of T could be traced using the group
key. Tsudik proposed the YA-TRAP protocol (6) that also uses lightweight
hash functions, but it is vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks, and although
some improvements of YA-TRAP have been proposed (7), they cannot cope
with active adversaries. In (8), the authors propose a new probabilistic and
lightweight RFID identification protocol. Sending a series of verification val-
ues from tags to readers, readers are able to quickly identify tags with a
certain level of confidence. The longer the size of the series of verification
values, the higher the level of confidence.
In a different line, Ohkubo, Suzuki and Kinoshita (9), and Conti et al. (10)
(11) use hash chain techniques to achieve forward security at the cost of some
performance decrease. Thus, although they succeed in obtaining forward
3
security, their proposals can hardly be used in RFID systems with large
amounts of tags.
The idea of making tags and/or readers to collaborate has been proposed
and tested. With regard to tags, in (12) and (13) a distribution of tags is used
to guide mobile robots equipped with RFID readers and to perform precise
indoor positioning respectively. Also, in (14) tags cooperate in order to
detect when and for how long a tag has been tampered with. With regard to
readers, to improve the scalability of hash-based solutions without increasing
the number of rounds of the protocol, Solanas et al. proposed an approach
that used collaborative readers deployed in a grid structure (15). Instead of
having a centralised database with all the tag IDs, each reader maintains a
local database (e.g. in a local cache) in which it stores the IDs of the tags
located in its cover area and the ones in its adjacent neighbours’ area. By
doing so, readers no longer need to check all possible IDs to identify a tag
but only a smaller subset of IDs in their local cache. Although the proposal
in (15) is a step forward in terms of scalability, it replicates too many tag IDs
and imposes several constraints to the system (e.g. readers must know the
exact distance to the tags and the reader distribution is very rigid). In (16),
Ahamed, Rahman and Hoque modified the proposal of Solanas et al. and
proposed a more natural neighbourhood structure using a hexagonal grid
(cf. Figure 2). Note that this solution reduces the number of neighbours
from nine (in the squared grid) to six (in the hexagonal grid). However, this
proposal has the same limitations of (15).
The idea of distributing tags amongst a number of readers distributed
in a grid or in hexagonal cells might resemble the antenna structure of the
well-known GSM system for mobile communications. In fact, readers store
information about tags similarly to what visitor location registers (VLR) do
with cell phones in GSM. However, there are some fundamental differences
that make our problem different:
• In GSM cell phones are active and they are responsible for the regis-
tration of their ID in the VLR.
• Visitor location registers (generally) do not exchange information be-
tween them. They mainly communicate with a centralised database
known as the home location register (HLR).
• We do not consider the existence of a centralised database such as the
HLR. Thus, our system might be consider fully decentralised.
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Figure 2: Left: Scheme of nine collaborative readers using a squared grid neighbour-
hood (15). Right: Scheme of four readers using a hexagonal grid neighbourhood (16).
Dashed lines represent neighbourhood relations amongst readers.
1.1. Contributions and Plan of the Article
In this article, we propose a new probabilistic protocol for the private
identification of RFID tags. This protocol drastically reduces redundant in-
formation in the caches of the readers and improves the efficiency of previous
proposals in terms of computational cost and bandwidth usage. In addition,
this new protocol imposes neither constraints on the readers’ distribution nor
in their neighbourhood relations (unlike (15) and (16)). Thanks to the prob-
abilistic nature of the proposed protocol and its parametrisation capabilities,
it can be tuned to balance the relation between computational cost in the
reader’s side and bandwidth usage.
The rest of the article is organised as follows: In Section 2, we describe our
protocol. First, in Subsection 2.1 we summarise our motivation for proposing
this new protocol, then in Subsection 2.2 we provide the reader with some
definitions and assumptions that are used throughout the article. Next,
in Subsection 2.3 the probabilistic nature of our protocol is explained and
justified. Section 2 finishes with Subsection 2.4 in which we describe in detail
the different messages used in our protocol, and Subsection 2.5 that shows
the protocol execution flow. Section 3 shows the results of the simulations,
and Section 4 contains some conclusions and further research lines.
2. The Protocol
2.1. Motivation
Hash-based identification protocols for RFID tags have shown to be pri-
vate and secure but they require a significant computational effort on the
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readers’ side that is generally overcome by using a centralised mainframe,
which can lead to bottlenecks and delays. Specifically, the number of oper-
ations performed by the mainframe to identify a single tag is a function of
the number of tags (n) in the system (i.e. f(n)).
An alternative to the centralised solution is the collaborative approach
that was first described in (15), whose main idea is to distribute the list of
tag IDs amongst all the readers in the system and allow them to identify
tags within their cover range without contacting a central mainframe. The
solution proposed by Solanas et al. improves the scalability of the system
with regard to the centralised solution. Ideally, if we consider a number of
readers (m) and a number of tags (n), the number of operations that must
be performed by a reader to identify a tag is a function of ( n
m
) (i.e. f( n
m
)).
Unfortunately, the protocol proposed by Solanas et al. requires the readers
to store the IDs of the tags controlled by neighbour readers, this leads to a
significant increase of redundant IDs. If we assume that the redundancy can
be expressed by a factor (k), the number of operations that a reader performs
to identify a tag using the protocol described in (15) is f(k×n
m
), where
f(
n
m
) < f(
k × n
m
) < f(n)
Our protocol leverages the idea of collaboration from (15), but implements
a new set of messages that permit the reduction of redundant information.
Ideally, we want k → 1. To do so, thanks to our protocol, readers can be
initialised with a parameter p ∈ [0, 1] that represents the probability for a
reader of storing tag IDs from its neighbours. Note that when p = 0, the
number of redundant IDs is zero and we reach the optimal situation where
the number of operations required to identify a tag is f( n
m
).
In addition, network designers/engineers can balance the reader’s compu-
tational cost and its bandwidth usage by tuning p. The smaller p is, the lower
the number of operations are, but the bandwidth requirements are higher.
2.2. Assumptions and Definitions
In our proposal, instead of using the concept of unshared cover area, as
described in (15), we use the more general concept of shared cover area.
Definition 1 (Unshared Cover Area (Au)). The unshared cover area of a
reader R is the set of locations controlled by R, from which tags can commu-
nicate only with R.
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Definition 2 (Shared Cover Area (As)). The shared cover area of a reader
R is the set of locations from which tags in the system can communicate with
R and possibly with other readers.
From these definitions it can be derived that given two shared cover areas
Asi and A
s
j , A
s
i ∩A
s
j might be different from the ∅, whilst given two unshared
cover areas Aui and A
u
j , A
u
i ∩ A
u
j is always ∅. Although this property of the
unshared cover areas might be theoretically useful, it is extremely hard to
realise it in practise. Thus, from now on, when we use the term cover area
we will refer to the more realistic concept of shared cover area described in
Definition 2 and, for the sake of clarity, we avoid using the superscript s.
Let Ai be the cover area of a reader Ri and let A be the area covered by
all the readers in the system. We assume that A ⊆
⋃i
Ai, ∀i.
Considering our definition of shared cover area, we define the neighbour-
hood relation as follows:
Definition 3 (Neighbourhood relation). Two readers Ri and Rj are neigh-
bours if their cover areas Ai and Aj are not disjoint i.e. Ai ∩Aj 6= ∅.
Our notions of cover area and neighbourhood are more flexible and realis-
tic than those proposed in (15) and (16). Also, they lead to a simple criterion
for connecting readers, i.e., only neighbour readers will share a communica-
tion link to exchange protocol messages. We assume that each reader in
the system is connected to its neighbours (e.g. using WLAN + SSL) and
maintains a local database with a list of pairs (IDT , IDR), where IDT is
the identifier of a given tag and IDR is the identifier of the reader. We also
assume that each tag is controlled by a single reader, which is its owner.
Note that by using the notion of shared cover areas the tags moving in
a region shared by two readers are controlled by only one of them. On the
contrary, if unshared cover areas are used, a tag moving from one unshared
cover area to another leads to the change of owner from one reader to another.
In Figure 3 an example of this behaviour is shown. If we use shared cover
areas, the tag T is controlled by R2 throughout its way. However, if we
consider the notion of unshared cover area, the tag T is controlled by R2
at locations (1), (3) and (5); and it is controlled by R1 at locations (2) and
(4). This unnecessary change of ownership requires communication between
readers and increases the bandwidth usage. Consequently, using shared cover
areas may decrease the utilised bandwidth.
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R1 R2
T 1
T 2
T 3
T 4
T 5
Figure 3: Graphical example of two readers R1, R2 and a tag T moving. The tag T is
captured in different positions at different instants T 1, T 2, T 3, T 4, and T 5 (T x indicates
the position of tag T at time x). The squares represent the unshared areas of R1 and R2.
The circles represent the shared areas of R1 and R2.
2.3. The Role of p
The number of operations performed in a reader to identify a tag is linear
with the number of tag IDs stored in its cache. A reader stores the IDs of the
tags in its cover area (for which it is responsible) – we say that that reader
is the owner of those tags. In addition, a reader may store the IDs of tags
located in the cover area of its neighbours. This way, if a tag moves from the
cover area of one of its neighbours, it can identify that tag without querying
its neighbours.
Each reader is initialised with a parameter p. This parameter defines the
probability for a given reader of storing neighbour tag’s IDs in its cache. If
p = 1 the reader stores all the IDs of its neighbour tags, on the contrary if
p = 0 the reader stores no information about its neighbours’ tags. If p takes
a value in (0, 1) the reader stores a number of IDs proportional to that value.
The main goal of p is to reduce the number of redundant IDs stored in the
cache of neighbour readers.
The number of IDs stored by a reader i (#IDi) can be computed as
follows:
#IDi = ni + pi
bi∑
j=1
nij
where ni is the number of tags owned by i, bi is the number of neighbours
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2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2
p = 0
5 7 5
7 10 7
5 7 5
p = 0.5
8 12 8
12 18 12
8 12 8
p = 1
Figure 4: Number of IDs stored in the readers for different values of p considering that
each reader is the owner of 2 tags. The neighbourhood relations are the ones described in
Figure 2-left.
of reader i, nij is the number of tags owned by the j-th neighbour of reader
i, and pi is the probability for the reader i of storing IDs of tags owned by
its neighbours. The total number of IDs stored in the system (#ID) can be
computed as
∑m
i=1#IDi, where m is the total number of readers.
In the example shown in Figure 4, it is apparent that reducing the value
of p, the number of IDs stored in the caches of the readers is also reduced.
Consequently, the number of operations required to identify a tag is also
reduced and the whole process of identifying tags scales better.
Note that the protocols described in (15) and (16) do no support the
addition of this probabilistic property. Thus, the main goal of the proposed
protocol, explained in the following sections, is to allow the use of the param-
eter p and, as a result, to improve the scalability of the identification process
in the readers’ side.
2.4. Messages
In our protocol, readers use a number of messages to exchange information
about the ownership of tags and collaborate to identify them. Each message
sent by a source reader (RIDS) to a destination reader (RIDD) makes the
latter perform an action regarding a tag (IDT ) (cf. to Figure 5 for a graphical
scheme of the message format, and its flow). Depending on the message, the
information sent about the tag can be:
• The tag ID – (IDT): If RIDS can identify the tag because it has
the required information in its cache, it can send IDT to RIDD . This
might happen for the following messages of the protocol: Delete, I am
the owner, You are the owner, and Search messages.
• The response of the tag r = (r2, h(r1||r2||IDT )) and the challenge
r1: If RIDS is not able to identify the tag, it sends to RIDD the challenge
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Message
Operation Source Destination Tag
3 bits 32 bits 32 bits 128 bits
IDS IDD IDT
IDS IDD r,r1
Flow
RIDS −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Message about the tag (IDT )
RIDD
RIDS ←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Information, ACK or NACK
RIDD
Figure 5: Message format and flow.
r1 that it sent to the tag and the answer r received from the tag. This
happens for the Identify message.
The messages of the protocol are explained in more detail below:
Delete - (IDT ) When RIDD receives this message, it removes the iden-
tifier IDT from its local cache.
I am the owner - (IDT) When RIDD receives this message, it realises
that RIDS claims the ownership of the tag IDT . If RIDD was the former
owner, it sends a Delete message to its neighbours, excepting RIDS and its
neighbours, to let them know that it is no longer the owner of that tag. If
RIDD was not the former owner, then it would generate a random number
x ∈ [0, 1], and if x ≥ p it would update its cache with the new ownership
information.
You are the owner - (IDT ) When RIDD receives this message, it takes
control over the tag IDT . It stores the new ownership information in its
cache and sends an I am the owner message to all its neighbours, so as to
propagate the new ownership information.
Identify - (r, r1) This message is sent by RIDS when it is not able to
determine the ID of a tag (using the Hash Lock protocol). With this message,
RIDS asks RIDD to identify the tag and return the ownership information
stored in its cache. If RIDD identifies the tag and finds its owner, it sends the
ID of the owner back to RIDS , otherwise it responds with a NACK message.
Search - (IDT ) When RIDD receives this message it checks whether the
tag IDT is in its cover area. If it finds the tag, it sends an ACK message
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Neighbours Tags in the cover
of R Reader R area of R
1 Challenge−−−−−−−−→
Answer(TID1)←−−−−−−−−−− 2
Answer(TID2)←−−−−−−−−−−
. . .
3 Answer(TIDn)←−−−−−−−−−−−
Identify tags
if OK → END
if KO
Identify(Tags)
←−−−−−−−−−−−
TagsInformation
−−−−−−−−−−→
Analyse Info
if missing tags
→ Recovery/Alarm
if OK
4
Build list
Search(Tags)
←−−−−−−−−−− 5
TagsInformation
−−−−−−−−−−→
Y ouAreTheOwner
←−−−−−−−−−−
END
Figure 6: Scheme of the flow of the identification protocol.
back to RIDS , otherwise it responds with a NACK.
2.5. Protocol Execution
Thanks to the probabilistic nature of our protocol, the number of IDs
stored in the local caches of the readers can be reduced with respect to the
protocols presented in (15) and (16), however, the flow of messages is a bit
more complex. The identification protocol proposed in this article considers
three main actors: (i) the tags in the system, (ii) a reader, and (iii) the
neighbours of that reader. The protocol schemed in Figure 6 works as follows:
1. A reader (R) sends a challenge (r1) to the tags in its cover range.
2. All tags in the cover range of R answer the challenge.
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3. For each tag (T ) responding to the challenge, R tries to identify it using
the hash-locks scheme (4) applied to its local cache.
(a) If it identifies the responding tag, the process finishes.
(b) Otherwise, R sends an Identify message to its neighbours and
stores their answers in its cache. If any of its neighbours identifies
the tag, R executes a recovery procedure described in the next
section.
4. Then, R builds a list (L) containing all the tags that it owns (i.e. which
are under its control) and that have not responded to the challenge (e.g.
those tags that have left its cover range).
5. For each tag T ∈ L, R sends a Search message to its neighbours. After
receiving the answers from its neighbours, R sends a You are the owner
message to the first neighbour that responded positively (i.e. ACK) to
the search message.
All the readers in the system periodically use this protocol. By doing so,
all tags can be controlled without the intervention of a centralised database.
In addition, due to the fact that readers only store information about the
tags of their neighbours with a given probability p, the number of redundant
IDs is reduced with respect to (15)(16) and, therefore, the computational
effort performed by the readers is also reduced.
2.6. Alarm/Recovery Protocol
When a reader is not able to identify a tag and its neighbours do not have
information about this tag neither, two possible situation might be tacking
place:
• An unauthorised tag has entered the system.
• A tag has been covered (so as to hide it from the readers) and uncovered
in a different location controlled by another reader whose neighbours
have no information about.
When this situation arises, we propose two possible solutions:
• A centralised solution: This solution is based on maintaining a backup
of all tag’s IDs in a centralised server. Doing so, when neither a reader
nor its neighbours could identify a tag, that reader could request the
identification of this tag to the centralised server. Note that, this so-
lution has a high computational cost but does not create bottlenecks
12
because the centralised server is supposed to be used in exceptional
cases only.
• A fully decentralised solution: In this case readers can iteratively query
their neighbours so as to find the previous owner of the tag in the
system. First the reader queries its adjacent neighbours (located at one
hop), then it queries the neighbours located at two hops, etc... This
procedure finishes when the tag ID is found or when all readers have
been queried. In the first case, our protocol keeps working normally,
in the second case, an alarm is raised. This procedure is depicted in
Figure 7. Note that in the worse case, in which all readers in the
system were to be queried, the computational cost would be linear on
the number of tags n. Although the computational cost is high and
the communication overhead might be significant, this situation should
happen rarely, thus, it should not affect the overall efficiency of the
proposed protocol.
T
Figure 7: A representation of cells covering the monitored area. An unidentified tag is
located in the central cell. The reader in that cell will iteratively query other readers to
identify T . Readers in lighter coloured cells are queried first.
2.7. Our protocol in a centralised back-end
Although our protocol has been designed to work in a distributed way. It
could be “simulated” by a centralised database (i.e. a back-end) connected
to a set of readers properly distributed. By doing so, the back-end would
be able to identify tags and “logically” cluster them in regions (e.g. virtually
covered by the readers). Thus, intelligently search a tag into these regions
might be scalable in terms of computational cost. In addition, this approach
averts the communication overhead associated with the exchange of messages
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between readers because all the communication might be “simulated” within
the back-end.
The main problems of using this approach are: (i) using a single cen-
tralised database leads to a single point of failure and, (ii) the communication
of a single back-end with a (possibly) large number of readers, might create
bottle-necks and undesired delays.
It might be said that depending on the special characteristics of the envi-
ronment in which the RFID system is to be deployed, engineers may decide
whether to use our protocol “simulated” within a back-end, or use it as a
fully distributed non-centralised protocol.
3. Simulation results
We have developed a simulator to analyse the number of operations per-
formed by the collaborative readers during the execution of our probabilistic
protocol, and their bandwidth usage. The simulator allows the deployment
of readers without constraints. The number of readers, their cover range,
their location, the number of moving tags, and the scenario in which they
move can be defined in the beginning of the simulation.
We have concentrated on simulations to analyse the theoretical properties
of our protocol and we have left for the future the implementation and testing
of a practical prototype. Although there are some limitations in the off-the-
shelves RFID tags, there exist some EPC UHF Gen 2 tags that are able
to compute hash functions and random numbers (using ARMADILLO (17),
and can be read at distances of up to 1 meter. Currently, newer versions with
larger reading distances (i.e. 3 m) are under development (cf. www.oridao.
com).
With the aim to evaluate our probabilistic protocol, we compare it with
the one presented in (15), which is referred hereafter as “original ”. Although
our protocol has no limitations related to the deployment and range of the
readers, the original protocol has some. Consequently, we simulate the reg-
ular distribution of 24 readers (4× 6) depicted in Figure 9 that the original
protocol can handle.
We have considered five different scenarios1: (i) An empty scenario in
which tags can freely move, (ii) a scenario with narrow corridors, (iii) a
1Some of these scenarios were already used in (15)
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Figure 8: Graphical scheme of the simulated scenarios. (From left to right) Scenario
with narrow corridors, scenario with wide corridors, scenario with random large obstacles,
scenario with random small obstacles.
Figure 9: Screenshot of the simulator. The cloud of red dots represents the tags entering
the system. Blue circles represent the shared cover area of the readers, which are identified
by a number. Thick black lines represent obstacles. Finally, thin black lines represent the
unshared cover areas that the protocol in (15) would use.
scenario with wide corridors, (iv) a scenario with randomly placed large ob-
stacles and, (v) a scenario with randomly placed small obstacles (cf. Figure 9
for a screenshot of the simulator and Figure 8 for a graphical scheme of the
four non-empty scenarios). For each scenario we have simulated the move-
ment of 103 and 104 tags. We have considered two different tags’ behaviour:
(i) a random movement and, (ii) a semi-directed movement: tags move half
of the times randomly and half of the times toward a far, randomly-selected
point within the scenario. Each simulation has been repeated 30 times for
each value of p in (0, 1) with increments of 0.1. Globally a total of 7.200
simulations2.
For each scenario we have concentrated in analysing the computational
22 types of movement × 5 different scenarios × 12 protocols (11 different p + the
original) × 30 repetitions × 2 different tags’ populations (103, 104)
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(a) Random movement - 103 tags
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(b) Random movement - 104 tags
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(c) Semi-directed movement - 103 tags
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(d) Semi-directed movement - 104 tags
Figure 10: Operations performed by the readers controlling 103 and 104 tags for different
values of p in all scenarios and with two different movement patterns (random and semi-
directed) The lower the better.
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Figure 11: Total number of bits transmitted by the readers controlling 103 and 104 tags
for different values of p in all scenarios and with two different movement patterns (random
and semi-directed) The lower the better.
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cost (in terms of number of operations performed by readers) and the band-
width usage (in terms of total number of bits sent). Figure 10 shown the
results for the computational cost and Figure 11 shows the results for the
bandwidth usage. It can be observed that our protocol has a significantly
lower computation cost than the original protocol. This is specially apparent
when the probability p is low3.
Regarding the bandwidth usage two different behaviours can be observed:
• With random movements: Tags change from a cell to another with low
probability (in our protocol). Thus, the number of required messages
to update the state of the readers’ caches is smaller. In this situation
our protocol is clearly more efficient than the original one.
• With semi-directed movements: Tags follow a clear path and change
from one cell to another with a higher probability. In this case, our
protocol requires more messages (specially in the case of using a low
p). Thus, in this situation the original protocol is more efficient for
smaller p.
In general, the computational cost is the main concern in RFID identifica-
tion protocols and, as we have shown above, our proposal clearly outperforms
the original protocol in this regard for all scenarios. Indeed, if bandwidth
usage is not a concern at all, our proposal with p = 0 is the optimal solution.
However, our protocol requires more bandwidth to improve the computa-
tional cost.
Capturing the trade-off between computational cost and bandwidth is not
trivial. Note that, the computational cost and bandwidth usage use different
measurement units. However, it is possible to define a measure in order to
compare our proposal with regard to the original protocol in terms of both,
computational cost and bandwidth usage.
Definition 4 (Trade-off measure). Let α be a real value in the range [0..1].
Let c and b be the computational cost and the bandwidth usage respectively
of the original protocol for a given configuration4. Let cp and bp be the com-
3Note that when the probability p tends to 1, our protocol tends to resemble the original
protocol in terms of computational cost. However, it is still better in most cases.
4A configuration will be defined by the number of tags in the system, the number of
readers and their distribution, the scenario, etc.
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putational cost and the bandwidth usage of our protocol using the same con-
figuration and p the probability value. Then, the trade-off measure that we
propose is computed as follows:
d(α, p) =
((cp
c
− 1
)
× 100
)
× α +
((
bp
b
− 1
)
× 100
)
× (1− α)
Intuitively, the proposed trade-off measure d(α, p) represents the perfor-
mance of the original protocol with regard to our protocol using p as the
probability value and, considering α the weight given to the computational
cost and 1 − α the weight given to the bandwidth usage. Note that, when
α = 0 the bandwidth usage is the only concern whilst when α = 1 only the
computational cost is considered.
Figures 12, 13 and 14 depict the performance of the original protocol with
regard to our protocol using the trade-off measure described above. At the
bottom of each figure there is a three dimensional chart showing the values of
d(α, p) for each α ∈ {0, 0.1, · · · , 0.9, 1} and each p ∈ {0, 0.1, · · · , 0.9, 1}. Also,
at the top left side and at the top right side of the figure there are the pro-
jections of the three dimensional charts for the x-axis and y-axis respectively.
In the x-axis projection, for each value of α the values of d(α, p)∀p ∈ [0, 1] are
shown, whilst in the y-axis projection the plot of the linear functions d(α, p)
with α fixed is shown.
It can be observed that our protocol outperforms the previous proposal
in most cases. When the movement of the tags is random, our protocol is
always better for all possible configurations. When the movement of the tags
is semi-directed our proposal is better in 81% of the cases. That leads to a
global improvement in more than 90% of all configurations.
4. Conclusion
We have presented an efficient communications protocol for collaborative
RFID readers to privately identify RFID tags. With the presented protocol,
the centralised management of tags can be avoided, along with bottlenecks
and undesired delays.
Our protocol is not a simple modification of previous proposals but a
completely different approach that clearly improves the efficiency and flexi-
bility of the whole system. In addition, due to the probabilistic nature of our
protocol, the system becomes very flexible (i.e. the relation between compu-
tational cost and communications overhead can be easily tuned by means of
19
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
 0
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
α
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
 0
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
p
0.1.2
.3.4.5
.6.7.8
.91
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.91
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
 0
α
p
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
 0
(a) Random movement - “Narrow
corridor” scenario
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
 0
 20
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
α
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
 0
 20
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
p
0.1.2
.3.4.5
.6.7.8
.91
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.91
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
 0
 20
α
p
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
 0
 20
(b) Semi-directed movement -
“Narrow corridor” scenario
-90
-80
-70
-60
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
 0
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
α
-90
-80
-70
-60
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
 0
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
p
0.1.2
.3.4.5
.6.7.8
.91
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.91
-90
-80
-70
-60
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
 0
α
p
-90
-80
-70
-60
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
 0
(c) Random movement - “Wide
corridor” scenario
-160
-140
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
 0
 20
 40
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
α
-160
-140
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
 0
 20
 40
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
p
0.1.2
.3.4.5
.6.7.8
.91
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.91
-160
-140
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
 0
 20
 40
α
p
-160-140
-120-100
-80-60
-40-20
 0 20
 40
(d) Semi-directed movement -
“Wide corridor” scenario
Figure 12: d(α, p) results for 104 tags and different values of p and α in the scenarios with
corridors. Values below zero indicate that our protocol is better with respect
to the “original” .
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Figure 13: d(α, p) results for 104 tags and different values of p and α in the empty scenario.
Values below zero indicate that our protocol is better with respect to the
“original” .
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Figure 14: d(α, p) results for 104 tags and different values of p and α in the scenarios with
random obstacles. Values below zero indicate that our protocol is better with
respect to the “original” .
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p). The simulation results confirm that our protocol outperforms previous
approaches like (15).
Although the presented protocol is an improvement, there are some open
issues that should be considered in the future, namely (i) study the effect
of the number of neighbours, (ii) propose methods to dynamically vary p
so as to adapt it to tags’ movements, (iii) propose hybrid methods that mix
hash-based solutions and tree-based solutions with collaborative readers, etc.
Appendix A. Brief Recap of the “Original” Protocol
The protocol described in (15), that we call “original”, was designed to
allow multiple readers to collaborate in order to exchange information about
tags so as to improve the scalability of the improved randomised hash-locks
(IRHL) identification procedure.
In the original protocol each reader was responsible for a squared cell and
they were all distributed in a grid structure. Note that, using this distribu-
tion, the areas covered by each reader were disjoint and, by construction, a
tag in a given location could only be queried by a single reader. (This is an
important difference with regard to the protocol described in this paper).
In the original protocol three main procedures/subprotocols were de-
scribed:
1. Tag arrival protocol: This protocol is applied when a tag enters the
system through a System Access Point or SAP. A reader controlling
this SAP identifies the tag using IRHL and communicates to all its
neighbours the ID of that tag. Then if that tag moves to any of the
cells controlled by these neighbours, they will be able to identify it.
2. Roaming protocol: This protocol is used when a tag changes its location
from a cell controlled by a reader to another cell. In this case, the reader
controlling the destination cell, informs all its neighbours that he is the
new owner of the tag and forwards the ID information of the tag to
all its neighbours. Also, the previous owner sends a message to its
neighbours so as to inform that it is no longer the owner of the tag.
3. Departure protocol: This protocol is used when a tag leaves the system.
In this case a reader controlling a System Exit Point (SEP) simply
forward to its neighbours the message of deleting that tag from their
caches.
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Appendix B. On the relation of p and the neighbours’ topology
In our protocol, the cache size of each reader linearly grows with p for
any readers’ distribution. However, neither the number of operations nor
the number of messages linearly change with p because they depend on the
neighbours’ topology. In particular, the number of “Identify” messages sent
by a reader R strongly depends on its number of neighbours.
Theorem 1. Let R be a reader receiving a response from a tag T , whose ID
is not stored in its cache. Let O be the owner of T and let NR,O be the set of
readers that are neighbours of R and O. Then, for |NR,O| > 0, the number
of “Identify” messages sent by R during the identification process of T is not
linear with regard to p.
Proof. “Identify” messages are sent when R needs the information of T in
order to identify it. These messages can be sent to any of R’s neighbours
but only O or those that are neighbours of O could answer positively to
this message. Therefore, without loss of generality we assume that R sends
“Identify” messages only to the readers in NR,O ∪ {O}.
Let SR′ be the event that represents a successfully “Identify” message
sent by R to the reader R′. Then, Pr(SR′) = Pr(SR′ |R
′ = O) Pr(R′ =
O) + Pr(SR′ |R
′ 6= O) Pr(R′ 6= O) and therefore:
Pr(SR′) =
1
|NR,O|+ 1
+
|NR,O|
|NR,O|+ 1
p . (B.1)
Let M be a random variable that represents the number of “Identify”
messages sent by R during the identification of T . Then, Pr(M = i) =
(1− Pr(SR′))
i−1Pr(SR′) therefore:
E(M) =
|NR,O|+1∑
i=1
iPr(M = i) =
|NR,O|+1∑
i=1
i(1− Pr(SR′))
i−1 Pr(SR′) (B.2)
Where E(M) is the expected value of M . Considering that Pr(SR′) is a
polynomial of degree 1 w.r.t. p (see Equation B.1), then E(M) is a polyno-
mial of degree |NR,O|+1 w.r.t. p (see Equation B.2). Therefore, we conclude
that, only when |NR,O| = 0 the number of “Identify” messages sent by R
during the identification process of T is linear regarding to p.
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Corollary 1. Neither the number of messages nor the number of operations
are linear regarding to p when |NR,O| > 0.
Proof. We have shown that the number of “Identify” messages is not linear
with p. Thus, due to the fact that the total number of messages includes
the “Identify” messages, it is also no-linear w.r.t. p. Regarding the compu-
tational cost, it is enough to consider that each “Identify” message causes an
exhaustive search in the cache of the reader that receives the message. Thus,
the computational cost is also non-linear w.r.t. p.
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